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Abstract: I analyse the effects of a downstream merger in a differentiated oligopoly 
when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or 
unions). Bargaining outcomes can be observable or unobservable by rivals. When 
competition is in quantities, upstream agents are independent and bargaining is over a 
uniform input price, a merger between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus 
and overall welfare. However, when competition is in prices or the upstream agents 
are not independent or bargaining is over a two-part tariff or bargaining covers both 
the input price and the level of output, the standard welfare results are restored: a 
downstream merger always reduces consumer surplus and overall welfare.  
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1. Introduction. 
Unionised or vertically related industries have recently attracted considerable 
attention by policymakers, antitrust authorities and economists. Following the 
seminal work of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), several studies have shown that an 
increase in buyers’ countervailing power or a downstream merger will reduce the 
prices charged by suppliers, although the welfare effects are less clear. When the 
downstream firms bargain with a single supplier, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), 
Dobson and Waterson (1997) and Chen (2003) have found that countervailing 
power will benefit consumers only when downstream competition is strong.1 
Allowing for more than one upstream agent, Ziss (1995) has argued that a 
downstream merger between duopolists will raise output when upstream suppliers 
set two-part tariffs, while Lommerud et al. (2005, 2006) have shown that certain 
types of mergers between a subset of downstream firms when uniform input prices 
are set by upstream agents will reduce input prices and may increase welfare.2 
 The present paper brings together some existing results and also extends 
the literature in a number of ways. I examine the effects of downstream mergers 
but unlike previous studies I do not assume that input prices are necessary linear 
and/or set unilaterally by upstream agents. Instead, I allow for bargaining between 
                                                 
1 Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2007) allow for an alternative source of supply at a cost 
that is independent of downstream market structure. In this context downstream 
mergers benefit consumers only if the alternative supplier is relatively inefficient. 
2 There is also a related literature on the effects of upstream mergers in vertically 
related industries. This again begins with Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and includes 
Ziss (1995), Chen and Ross (2003), O’Brien and Shaffer (2005), and Milliou and 
Petrakis (2007). Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) and Inderst and Shaffer (2007) focus 
primarily on the effects of mergers in vertically related industries on innovation and 
product variety. 
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downstream firms and upstream agents (firm or unions). The importance of 
bargaining in unionised firms has long been recognised and its importance in 
vertically related industries is also increasingly being recognised due to rising 
levels of concentration in many downstream markets. Moreover, I analyse a range 
of bargaining structures, including bargaining over a uniform input price, over a 
two-part tariff and over both the input price and output. I also allow downstream 
competition to be over quantities or prices and I examine a variety of upstream 
market structures: independent, firm-specific and industry-wide upstream agents.3 
In this context, the bargaining outcome between a downstream firm and its 
upstream agent can be either observable or unobservable by rivals, and I examine 
both cases. Finally, I provide a comprehensive analysis of welfare results. A new 
and important result of the paper is that the welfare effects of a downstream 
merger are sensitive to the mode of downstream competition and to the bargaining 
structure, although they are not affected by whether bargaining outcomes are 
observable by rivals or not. 
In the basic version of my model, two downstream firms (or divisions of a 
merged firm) sell a horizontally differentiated product. Prior to that, each of the 
two firms bargains with its upstream agent and the bargaining process is 
represented by the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.4 The structure of the 
                                                 
3 Lommerud et al. (2005) discuss some of these alternative scenarios, although they 
do not generally explore their welfare implications. 
4 A well-known and important property of the Nash bargaining solution is that it 
can be implemented as the outcome of a dynamic non-cooperative alternating-
offers bargaining game (Binmore et al. 1986). The use of the Nash bargaining 
solution is common in models of bargaining between upstream agents and 
downstream firms. In contrast, Inderst and Wey (2003) apply an alternative 
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downstream market has been determined before the bargaining stage: a merger is a 
long-run decision, which is more difficult to change than a bargaining outcome. In 
common with most of the literature on bilateral oligopoly, I assume that a merger 
does not generate efficiency gains: this allows me to focus on the implications of 
the vertical relationships. Also, I do not consider the question of product choice: 
both varieties of the product are produced after the merger. For most of the paper, 
bargaining is decentralised, i.e. each downstream firm bargains separately with an 
upstream agent. This is an obvious modelling choice when the upstream agents are 
firms. Even in the case of unions, decentralised bargaining has long been 
predominant in several countries, and a trend toward decentralised bargaining 
structures has been observed in recent years in many other countries. Moreover, 
each downstream firm (or, in the case of a full merger, each division of the merged 
firm) and its upstream agent are locked into bilateral relations. This implies that a 
downstream firm cannot produce any output in the event of a breakdown in the 
negotiations with its upstream agent. This is discussed more extensively in the 
concluding section.  
I begin with the case where the downstream firms set quantities, bargaining 
is over a uniform input price, bargaining outcomes are observable by all and the 
upstream agents remain independent after the downstream merger and each of 
them bargains with one division of the merged firm – which implies that the 
upstream agents are either independent firms or plant-specific unions. The 
independence of upstream agents is relevant for international mergers, since 
unions do not usually transcend national borders. It is also relevant for domestic 
                                                                                                                                            
bargaining procedure that gives rise to the Shapley value, while de Fonteney and 
Gans (2005) use a fully specified non-cooperative bargaining model. 
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mergers when each downstream firm becomes a plant of the merged firm and 
bargains with a plant-specific union (as may be the case when the products are 
differentiated) or an independent supplier (since there is no reason for suppliers to 
merge when buyers merge). Bargaining over a uniform input price is a common 
assumption in models of bilateral oligopoly and the literature on union-firm 
bargaining. In this context, consumer surplus and total welfare can be higher or 
lower under the merger. This result is not new, although my contribution lies in 
showing exactly how it depends on the degree of product differentiation and the 
distribution of bargaining power between the parties. 
The rest of the paper considers four alternative scenarios: price 
competition, non-independent upstream agents, two-part tariffs, and bargaining 
over both input price and output. Furthermore, I check the robustness of the results 
to the assumption of observability of bargaining outcomes and I also extend the 
analysis to the case where there are three downstream firms, only two of which are 
involved in a merger. Price-setting is an obvious alternative mode of downstream 
competition. Firm-specific upstream agents are relevant for many domestic 
mergers when negotiations with unions take place at the level of the firm rather 
than separately for each plant. Industry-wide unions or single upstream sellers are 
also an institutional feature of many industries. The type of bargaining can also 
vary across industries: in fact, uniform price contracts are generally inefficient.5 
These changes are introduced one at a time and each has a significant impact on 
the results. In all cases the standard welfare results of oligopoly theory are 
                                                 
5 The question of choice of bargaining structure is beyond the scope of this paper. 
See, for example, Dobson (1997), Petrakis and Vlassis (2000), Milliou et al. (2003). 
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restored: a downstream merger always reduces consumer surplus and social 
welfare. 
 A common and plausible assumption in the literature on union-firm wage 
bargaining under oligopoly is that bargaining outcomes are made public and are 
therefore observable by all before the product price or quantity setting-stage. On 
the other hand, in much of the literature on vertical oligopolies where the upstream 
agents are firms it is assumed instead that vertical contracts are secret and 
therefore unobservable by rivals. I examine both cases and I find that my results 
are the same whether bargaining outcomes are observable or not. 
 A somewhat restrictive feature of the basic model is that the downstream 
industry in the absence of a merger is a duopoly. Therefore a downstream merger 
is a merger to monopoly. This assumption is necessary to ensure that the model 
remains tractable while at the same time allowing for an arbitrary distribution of 
bargaining power between upstream agents and downstream firms. In practice, 
however, nearly all mergers involve only a subset of firms in an industry. To 
examine the welfare effects of such a merger I use the simplest possible setup: a 
three-firm downstream oligopoly where two of the firms merge. To ensure 
tractability of the model in this case I often need to assume a specific distribution 
of bargaining power between upstream agents and downstream firms. The results I 
derive are identical to those obtained for the duopoly case. 
Some of the themes that I analyse here are also explored in a number of 
other papers. Ziss (1995) has found that under certain conditions a downstream 
merger will lead to higher output when upstream suppliers set two-part tariffs in a 
vertical duopoly. However, there is no bargaining in his model, no analysis of 
alternative bargaining structures and upstream market structures, and no analysis 
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of the case of unobservable contracts. In fact, my results differ from those 
obtained by Ziss. Lommerud et al. (2005, 2006) find that a merger between a 
subset of downstream firms can lead to lower input prices and may increase 
welfare. However, they do not consider bargaining over input prices in their model 
and do not analyse two-part tariffs or unobservable input prices. My approach 
differs from theirs in several ways. I analyse a range of bargaining structures – and 
I find that the effects of a downstream merger depend on the bargaining structure. 
I allow for bargaining outcomes to be either observable or unobservable. Finally, I 
provide a more extensive and systematic analysis of welfare results and emphasise 
how the conventional welfare results of oligopoly theory are restored under a wide 
variety of setups for the bilateral industry.  
Symeonidis (2008) is a companion paper to this one. However, there are 
several important differences. First, instead of examining the effect of a 
downstream merger, the companion paper analyses changes in the intensity of 
competition among independent downstream firms. Since any merger must occur 
before the bargaining stage, the downstream firms in the present paper cooperate 
at the bargaining stage when a merger occurs, while in the companion paper they 
always act independently. Hence the payoffs at the bargaining stage are different 
in the two papers, and so are many of the results. For instance, in the case of 
bargaining over two-part tariffs, the result of Symeonidis (2008) that a decrease in the 
intensity of downstream competition causes input prices to fall and welfare to increase 
is completely reversed: the present paper shows that input prices rise and welfare 
always decreases when downstream firms merge. Second, the companion paper only 
analyses a duopolistic industry and assumes observable bargaining outcomes, 
while the present paper relaxes both these assumptions. Third, the companion 
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paper examines a much more restricted range of downstream competition modes, 
bargaining structures and upstream market structures: quantity-setting downstream 
firms and independent upstream agents. The main focus of the present paper, on the 
other hand, is the analysis of the alternative scenarios mentioned above. In all these 
alternative scenarios, welfare unambiguously decreases with a downstream merger. 
The conclusion is that the non-standard welfare results of the previous literature in 
similar settings appear in only one possible case among many. In all the other cases 
the standard welfare effects of mergers continue to hold when we add upstream firms 
or unions to the standard downstream duopoly. This conclusion contrasts sharply with 
most of the existing literature in this area, which has focused primarily on quantity 
competition and uniform input prices.6 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the benchmark case 
of two quantity-setting downstream firms, independent upstream agents and 
bargaining over a uniform input price with observable bargaining outcomes. In 
sections 3-6 alternative modes of downstream competition, bargaining structures 
and upstream market structures are analysed. Section 7 examines the case of 
unobservable bargaining outcomes. The case of a three-firm oligopoly is briefly 
discussed in the concluding remarks and analysed in detail in the Appendix.  
 
                                                 
6 Three other studies have examined the effects of mergers using a similar framework. 
Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2000) focus on how a downstream merger affects the 
choice of organisational form for the merged firm and the unions. Ziss (2001) and 
González-Maestre and López-Cunat (2001) analyse mergers in a homogeneous 
Cournot model where each owner delegates output decisions to a manager, a setup 
that has similarities with a bilateral duopoly. However, they are mainly interested in 
merger profitability and do not explore the same issues as the present paper. 
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2. Quantity-setting downstream firms, independent upstream agents and 
bargaining over a uniform input price. 
Consider an industry with two firms, each producing and selling to consumers one 
variety of a differentiated product. Preferences are described by a standard quadratic 
utility function of a representative consumer: 
.)()( 21
2
2
2
121 MxxxxxxU +−+−+= βσβα    (1) 
The xi’s are the quantities demanded of the different varieties of the product, while 
 denotes expenditure on outside goods. The parameter σ, 
σ∈(0,2), is an inverse measure of the degree of horizontal product differentiation: in 
the limit as σ → 0 the goods become independent, while in the limit as σ → 2 they 
become perfect substitutes. Finally, α and β are positive scale parameters. 
2211 xpxpYM −−=
The inverse demand function for variety i is given by 
jii xxp βσβα −−= 2    (2) 
in the region of quantity spaces where prices are positive, and the demand function is 
)2)(2(
)()(2
σσβ
ασα
+−
−−−= jii
pp
x      (3) 
in the region of prices where quantities are positive. Let firm i have marginal cost of 
production wi, where wi < α. In particular, assume that only one input, L, is used in 
the production of variety i and has a unit price equal to wi. This input can be labour, in 
which case wi is the wage rate; it can be an intermediate product sold by upstream 
suppliers to downstream manufacturers; or it can be the final product, in which case 
the downstream firms are distributors. There are constant returns to scale, so xi = Li.  
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Competition in the industry is described by a two-stage game as follows.7 
There are two downstream firms, which can be independent or merged; this is 
known at the beginning of the game. At stage 1, each downstream firm (or division) 
i forms a bargaining unit with an independent upstream agent and bargains over 
wi. Although each bargain is independent, there is also interaction at this stage: the 
set of wi that we obtain is the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
between the two bargaining units. At stage 2, the downstream firms observe the 
outcomes of stage 1 and compete in quantities given the values of wi from stage 1. 
In what follows I derive the pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of this 
game. 
At the second-stage subgame, firm i chooses xi to maximise the sum of its own 
profit and a fraction λ of the profit of its rival: jii λππ +=Π , where 
iijiiiii xwxxxwp )2()( −−−=−= βσβαπ . (4) 
The parameter λ, λ∈[0,1], is the degree of cross-ownership, with λ = 0 corresponding 
to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and λ = 1 corresponding to a full merger. A positive 
value for λ could also result from a strategic alliance between the downstream firms. 
The equilibrium values of xi and pi in the second-stage subgame as functions of wi 
and wj are: 
                                                 
7 See also Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Dowrick (1989), Petrakis and Vlassis (2000), 
Naylor (2002), Correa-Lopez and Naylor (2004), Correa-López (2007). These papers 
analyse models with a similar structure to the one presented here (i.e. multistage 
oligopoly games with a bargaining stage followed by a product market competition 
stage), but none of them examines the welfare effects of downstream mergers. 
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in the region of w spaces where  ≥ 0, ≥ 0, i = 1,2 (this is satisfied as long as 
wi and wj are not too dissimilar – but the case where wi and wj are too dissimilar is 
not relevant as a potential equilibrium of the two-stage game because a bargaining 
unit would not choose a level of w that would result in zero sales). 
ixˆ ipˆ
 At stage 1 of the game, the downstream firm i and the upstream agent i 
form a bargaining unit and set wi to maximise the Nash product  
[ ] [ ] ϕϕ λλ −−−−+−−=Ω 10 )(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( jjjjjjiiiiii xwpxwpxwpxww .  (6) 
The parameter ϕ∈[0,1] is a measure of the bargaining power of the upstream agent 
relative to that of the downstream firm. It depends on the relative degrees of 
impatience and risk aversion of the two parties, so it is taken here as exogenous. 
The value ϕ = 1 corresponds to the case where wi is set by the upstream agent, 
while ϕ = 0 corresponds to the case where wi is set by the downstream firm. The 
parameter wo is either the wage that a union would obtain in a competitive labour 
market or the unit cost of an upstream firm. The utility of the upstream agent is 
given by . Recall that xi = Li. So when the upstream agent is a 
union, it aims to maximise the total rent – or the wage bill if wo = 0. When the 
upstream agent is a firm, it aims to maximise its profit. 
iii xwwU )( 0−=
 The upstream agent’s payoff in the Nash product is its own utility, i.e. any 
degree of cross-ownership between downstream firms does not affect the 
independence of the upstream agents. The downstream firm i wishes to maximise 
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jii λππ +=Π
jxˆ
 minus its disagreement payoff. In particular, while , ,  and 
 are given in equations (5), 
ipˆ ixˆ jpˆ
2)( jjj wwp −+= α  and βα 4)jw(jx −=  are the 
price and output of good j in case of a breakdown of negotiations between the 
downstream firm i and upstream agent i. Note that in case of disagreement within 
one bargaining unit, the other downstream firm acts as a monopolist and supplies 
the monopoly quantity.8 
 As pointed out earlier, the values of wi and wj that we obtain at stage 1 of 
the game are the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the two 
bargaining units: wi is the Nash solution to the bargaining problem between 
downstream firm i and its upstream agent given that both expect the input price wj 
to be agreed between downstream firm j and its upstream agent. In the case of a 
merger, the merged firm bargains simultaneously and separately with the two 
upstream agents (see Davidson 1988): one bargain is over product i, the other over 
product j. Solving for the equilibrium we obtain: 
[ ]
)1(8
)()1(4
* 00 λϕσ
αλσϕ
+−
−+−+= www  (7) 
and therefore 
[ ]2 0)1(8
))(2(4*
λϕσ
αϕϕσ
λ +−
−−−=∂
∂ ww ,  (8) 
which is negative for all σ∈(0,2), ϕ∈(0,1].9 
                                                 
8 While this is a plausible and common assumption, it is not the only one. Another 
possibility, not examined here, would be for the other firm to operate at the 
anticipated equilibrium level of production (Horn and Wolinsky 1988). 
9 The second-order condition for a maximum of the Nash product is always satisfied: 
[ ]
[ ] 0)()1(4)2(
)1(82*)(
2
0
2
2
22 <−+−−
+−−===∂Ω∂
w
wwww jiii αλσϕϕ
λϕσ . 
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Proposition 1. When quantity-setting downstream firms and independent upstream 
agents bargain over a uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the input price decreases 
in the degree of cross-ownership λ. For ϕ = 0, the input price is independent of λ 
and equal to wo. 
This is similar to the result obtained by Lommerud et al. (2005) and 
Symeonidis (2008) in a somewhat different context.10 It holds for any values of 
ϕ∈(0,1], i.e. as long as the upstream agents have some bargaining power. The 
intuition is as follows. First, output is lower for any given w the higher the value 
of λ, so upstream agents have less to gain from a unit rise in w. This is one reason 
why w* falls as λ rises. Furthermore, an increase in the input price of one product 
shifts production to the other product and this effect is stronger the higher the 
value of λ. As a result, each upstream agent loses more output to the other 
upstream agent from a higher input price for its product the higher the value of λ. 
This effect is sometimes referred to as an increased level of rivalry between 
upstream agents, and it could also be described as a form of increased 
countervailing power of the downstream industry. It is a second reason why w* 
falls as λ rises. 
Equilibrium consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit and aggregate 
upstream utility are, respectively, given as 
**2*)(*)(2*2* 22 xpxxxCS −−−= βσβα   (9) 
**)*(2Π* xwp −=   (10) 
                                                 
10 See also Correa-López and Naylor (2004) for a related argument, and Symeonidis 
(2000) for an analogous mechanism in the context of a vertical differentiation model. 
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and 
*)*(2* 0 xwwU −= , (11) 
where x* and p* are the equilibrium values of x and p in the two-stage game and 
are given by equations (5) after setting wi = wj = w*. 
The next result shows that consumer surplus and total welfare may be 
higher or lower under a downstream merger than when downstream firms are 
independent, while downstream profit always increases and upstream utility 
always decreases with the merger. 
Proposition 2. When quantity-setting downstream firms and independent upstream 
agents bargain over a uniform input price: 
(i) Consumer surplus is higher under a downstream merger than when 
downstream firms are independent if the products are close substitutes and 
upstream agents have significant bargaining power. Consumer surplus is lower 
under a downstream merger than when downstream firms are independent if the 
products are very differentiated or upstream agents have little bargaining power. 
(ii) The aggregate downstream profit increases in the degree of cross-ownership λ 
for all λ∈[0,1), ϕ∈[0,1]. The aggregate upstream utility decreases in λ for ϕ∈(0,1]. 
When ϕ = 0, the upstream utility is independent of λ and equal to zero. 
(iii) Total welfare is higher under a downstream merger than when downstream 
firms are independent if the products are close substitutes and upstream agents 
have significant bargaining power. Total welfare is lower under a downstream 
merger than when downstream firms are independent if the products are very 
differentiated or upstream agents have little bargaining power. 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
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 The intuition for the first part of Proposition 2 is as follows. The total effect of 
a change in λ on consumer surplus is the sum of a negative direct effect on consumer 
surplus for any given level of w and an indirect effect working through the change in 
w. This latter effect is positive (or zero) since λ∂
∂ *w
 ≤ 0 (Proposition 1) and 
*w
CS
∂
∂
 < 0. 
Hence the total effect can be ambiguous. When the products are close substitutes (σ 
is close to 2) and the upstream agents have significant bargaining power (ϕ is large), 
the difference between )1(* =λw  and )0(* =λw  is larger and therefore the 
indirect positive effect of a downstream merger on consumer surplus is stronger. 
This effect then dominates the direct negative effect of the merger (which is also 
stronger the higher the value of σ). 
 A downstream merger has a direct and an indirect effect on downstream profit, 
with both effects working in the same direction. For any given w, downstream profit 
increases in λ for all λ∈[0,1). Since the equilibrium input price decreases in λ for all 
ϕ∈(0,1] (and is independent of λ when ϕ = 0) and a lower w raises downstream profit 
(a straightforward result from equations (5)), the indirect effect of λ on downstream 
profit will reinforce the direct effect (or be equal to zero). 
 Finally, the effect of a downstream merger on upstream utility can be 
decomposed into three different effects. First, there is the effect of a change in λ 
on the equilibrium input price w*. This effect is negative – or, in a special case, 
zero. Second, there is the effect of a change in λ on the equilibrium level of output 
x*. This is also negative, since output is lower the higher the value of λ for any 
given level of w. Third, the indirect effect of a change in λ on x* that works 
through the change in w. Since we have λ∂
∂ *w
 ≤ 0 and 
*
*
w
x
∂
∂
, this is positive or 
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zero. However, this third effect is a second-order one, and λ∂∂ *U  is negative in 
the present model.  
 
3. Price-setting downstream firms. 
When the downstream firms set prices in the second-stage subgame, firm i chooses pi 
to maximise jii λππ +=Π , where 
[ ]
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The equilibrium values of pi and xi in the second-stage subgame are: 
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in the region of w spaces where  ≥ 0, ≥ 0, i = 1,2 (this is satisfied as long as 
wi and wj are not too dissimilar – but again this is the only relevant case). 
ixˆ ipˆ
 At stage 1 of the game, the downstream firm i and the upstream agent i set 
wi to maximise the Nash product given by equation (6), where , ,  and  
are now given in (13) and 
ipˆ ixˆ jpˆ jxˆ
jp  and jx  are as previously defined. Once again wi and 
wj are the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the two 
bargaining units. In the case of a merger, the merged firm bargains simultaneously 
and separately with the upstream agents. Solving for the equilibrium and 
evaluating the resulting expression for different values of λ we obtain: 
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which is negative for all σ∈(0,2), ϕ∈(0,1].11  
Proposition 3. When price-setting downstream firms and independent upstream 
agents bargain over a uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the input price is lower 
under a downstream merger than when downstream firms are independent. For ϕ 
= 0, the input price is constant and equal to wo. 
Although Proposition 3 mirrors Proposition 1, and the intuition is similar in 
the two cases, the welfare results are different.  
Proposition 4. When price-setting downstream firms and independent upstream 
agents bargain over a uniform input price: 
(i) Consumer surplus is lower under a downstream merger than when downstream 
firms are independent. 
(ii) The aggregate downstream profit is higher under a downstream merger than 
when downstream firms are independent. The aggregate upstream utility is lower 
under a downstream merger than when downstream firms are independent for 
ϕ∈(0,1]. For ϕ = 0, the upstream utility is constant and equal to zero. 
                                                 
11 The second-order condition for a maximum of the Nash product is always satisfied: 
0
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(iii) Total welfare is lower under a downstream merger than when downstream 
firms are independent. 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
As in the quantity-setting case, a merger has a direct negative effect on 
consumer surplus and an indirect positive effect working through the reduction in 
w. However, downstream competition is relaxed more by a merger between 
duopolists under price-setting than under quantity-setting, so the direct negative 
effect on consumer surplus is stronger. This is one reason why the direct effect 
always dominates the indirect effect when the downstream firms set prices.  
If this were the only reason, then the differences between the quantity-
setting case and the price-setting case might be limited to the context of a 
downstream duopoly. However, as will be shown in the Appendix, this is not the 
case: these differences persist when two firms merge in a three-firm oligopoly. 
There is, in fact, also a second mechanism driving Proposition 6: the indirect 
positive effect of a merger on consumer surplus working through the fall in w is 
weaker when firms set prices (especially when σ is not close to 0 and ϕ is large) 
because the fall in w brought about by the merger is then smaller than in the 
quantity-setting case. To understand why this is so, note that for λ = 1 the 
equilibrium input price is independent of the short-term choice variable – price or 
quantity. When λ = 0, however, the input price is lower in the price-setting case 
than in the quantity-setting case: the incentive of a bargaining unit to set a low 
input price is stronger in the former case than in the latter because the anticipated 
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downstream competition is tougher – and this is even more so the higher the 
values of σ and ϕ.12 
 A downstream merger has a direct and an indirect effect on downstream profit, 
with both effects working in the same direction. For any given input price, 
downstream profit increases after a merger. Moreover, because w decreases (or, if 
ϕ = 0, it does not change) and a lower w raises downstream profit (a straightforward 
result using equations (13)), the indirect effect is also positive (or zero). 
 The effect of a downstream merger on upstream utility can be decomposed 
into three different effects that work in opposite directions (see section 2). The 
negative direct effect of a merger on output for any given w is stronger than in the 
quantity-setting case because the difference between the Nash equilibrium and the 
monopoly output is larger under price-setting. On the other hand, the negative 
effect of a merger on the equilibrium input price is weaker than in the quantity-
setting case and this also implies that the indirect effect of a merger on output that 
works through the change in w is also weaker. So the balance of these three 
different effects is not significantly changed when we replace quantity setting by 
                                                 
12 Note that this result is not driven by strategic effects and the distinction between 
strategic substitutes and strategic complements. The strategic effects – an increase in 
the input price under price competition and a decrease in the input price under 
quantity competition relative to the case of no strategic effects – are present but they 
are relatively small: a comparison of the results of this section with those of section 7 
below suggests that, as expected, the input price in lower when it is observable than 
when it is unobservable if downstream firms set quantities and the reverse is the case 
when downstream firms set prices. This also implies that the difference between the 
input price under quantity setting and that under price setting for λ = 0 is even greater 
when input prices are unobservable. 
 18
price setting, and it is therefore not very surprising that a downstream merger 
again reduces upstream utility – or, in a special case, does not affect it.  
To summarise, although a downstream merger reduces the input price when 
downstream firms set prices, the direct effects on consumer surplus and total welfare 
are relatively strong and the indirect effects relatively weak. Therefore the former 
always dominate the latter – unlike the quantity-setting case – and the standard 
welfare results are restored: the merger always reduces consumer surplus and welfare. 
 
4. Firm-specific or industry-wide upstream agents. 
In this section I return to the case of quantity-setting firms in order to examine the 
implications of alternative upstream market structures: firm-specific or industry-wide 
upstream agents. I will focus on the former case because the latter is straightforward 
and has been examined in previous work on centralised bargaining. Thus it is 
known that the competitive regime facing downstream firms has no effect on the 
bargaining outcome under fairly general conditions when firms participate in 
centralised bargaining before competing in the downstream market (Dowrick 
1989, Dhillon and Petrakis 2002). This is also the case here: the input price is the 
same whether the downstream firms merge or not. Since there are no indirect 
welfare effects of a downstream merger, the conventional welfare results apply. 
When the upstream agents are firm-specific, they also merge when the 
downstream firms merge, a case that can be relevant for many domestic mergers when 
the upstream agents are unions. To assess the effects of a downstream merger in this 
case, the relevant comparison is between decentralised bargaining with downstream 
Cournot competition, on the one hand, and centralised bargaining with downstream 
monopoly, on the other. In the former case, the equilibrium input price and welfare 
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expressions are the same as those obtained in section 2, after setting λ = 0. In the 
latter case, the second-stage equilibrium outcome is given by equations (5) after 
setting λ = 1, while at stage 1 the merged downstream firm and the single upstream 
agent set wM so as to maximise the Nash product  
[ ] [ ϕϕ −−+−+−=Ω 10 ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ()ˆˆ)(( jMMjMiMMiMjMiMM xwpxwpxxww ] . (17) 
Here , ,  and  are the monopoly prices and quantities and are given 
in equations (5) for λ = 1.  
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Proposition 5. When quantity-setting downstream firms and firm-specific 
upstream agents bargain over a uniform input price and ϕ∈(0,1], the input price is 
higher under a downstream merger than when downstream firms are independent. 
For ϕ = 0, the input price is independent of λ and equal to wo. 
This is the opposite of the result obtained for the case of independent 
upstream agents, but it is not surprising (see also Lommerud et al. 2005). When the 
upstream agents also merge, the rivalry between them is eliminated and this causes 
the input price to rise.  
The effect of a merger on consumer surplus is unambiguously negative: both 
the direct and the indirect effect on consumer surplus work in the same direction. The 
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most interesting aspect of a merger with firm-specific upstream agents is its effect on 
downstream profit and upstream utility.13 
Proposition 6. When quantity-setting downstream firms and firm-specific 
upstream agents bargain over a uniform input price: 
(i) Consumer surplus is lower under a downstream merger than when downstream 
firms are independent. 
(ii) The downstream profit and the upstream utility can be higher or lower under a 
downstream merger than when downstream firms are independent: if ϕ < 
)4(
)244(8)(~ σσ
σσσϕ +
+−+=Π , a downstream merger raises downstream profit and 
upstream utility; if )(~ σϕΠ  < ϕ < )4(
)21632(24)4(8
)(~
32
σσ
σσσσσϕ +
−−+−+=U , a 
downstream merger reduces downstream profit and raises upstream utility; and if ϕ 
> )(~ σϕU , a downstream merger reduces downstream profit and upstream utility. 
(iii) Total welfare is lower under a downstream merger than when downstream 
firms are independent. 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 The total effect of a merger on downstream profit can be decomposed into two 
effects. First, a direct effect: the merger restricts output and so raises downstream 
profit for any given value of w. Second, an indirect effect: the merger raises w and 
therefore reduces downstream profit. The higher the value of ϕ, i.e. the greater the 
bargaining power of the upstream agents, the greater the difference 
0
**
=
−
λ
wwM , i.e. 
                                                 
13 Lommerud et al. (2005) have also identified an ambiguous effect of a downstream 
merger on downstream profit when upstream agents are firm-specific. However, there 
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the more w rises following a merger, and therefore the more likely for the indirect 
effect to dominate and for downstream profit to fall. 
The total effect of a merger on upstream utility can be decomposed into three 
effects. First, the merger restricts output and so reduces upstream utility for any given 
value of w. Second, it increases w and therefore increases upstream utility. Third, the 
increase in w has an indirect negative effect on output, and therefore also on upstream 
utility. An increase in ϕ strengthens these effects and also shifts the balance between 
them so that upstream utility is more likely to fall after the merger. Note that the 
positive direct effect of w on upstream utility helps explain why )(~ σϕΠ  < )(~ σϕU : 
downstream profit falls but upstream utility rises after a merger when ϕ takes 
intermediate values. 
To summarise, a downstream merger increases the input price when upstream 
agents are firm-specific, and so it reduces consumer surplus and welfare. Downstream 
profit and upstream utility can be higher or lower after the merger: they will be higher 
if upstream agents have low bargaining power, lower if upstream agents have 
significant bargaining power, and there exists a range of intermediate values of ϕ for 
which the merger reduces downstream profit and raises upstream utility. 
 
5. Bargaining over two-part tariffs. 
The assumption that input prices are linear tariffs may be somewhat restrictive, 
especially when the upstream agents are firms, given that uniform price contracts 
are inefficient and upstream firms are less constrained than unions by institutional 
factors when specifying a contract with downstream firms. Of course, uniform 
                                                                                                                                            
is no bargaining in their model, so the mechanism I describe is different from theirs. 
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price contracts are often observed in practice.14 Still, one would want to analyse 
how the results might change under non-linear price contracts between upstream 
agents and downstream firms. Although this analysis may be more relevant when 
the upstream agents are firms (especially when there are close relationships 
between downstream firms and upstream suppliers, which is the case examined in 
this paper), it is also possible to interpret this case as a union-firm bargain, where 
there is a lump-sum payment to the union or a non-monetary benefit such as an 
improvement in working conditions which has a monetary equivalent.15 
In this section I modify the model of section 2 to allow for bargaining over 
two-part tariffs. Again I allow for different degrees of cross-ownership in the 
downstream market. The own profit of downstream firm i is now given by 
iiiii Fxwp −−= )(π , where Fi ≥ 0 is a lump sum transfer from downstream firm i 
to its upstream agent.16 Stage 2 of the two-stage game is as in section 2, the only 
difference being that now the downstream firms compete in quantities given the 
unit input prices and fixed fees set at stage 1. At stage 1, each downstream firm i 
bargains over wi and Fi with an independent upstream agent. If λ = 1, the merged 
                                                 
14 See, for instance, Smith and Thanassoulis (2006). On the other hand, Villas-
Boas (2007) and Bonnet et al. (2006) report evidence consistent with the use of 
non-linear contracts. 
15 There is one difficulty with the interpretation in terms of a lump-sum payment to 
union members: the derived equilibrium yields a wage lower than the reservation 
wage, which seems implausible. Note, however, that this is due to quantity-setting by 
downstream firms. I focus here on the quantity-setting case in order to identify in a 
clear way the effect of bargaining over two-part tariffs relative to the benchmark case 
of bargaining over linear tariffs examined in section 2. 
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firm bargains simultaneously with the two upstream agents. The values of wi and 
Fi are chosen to maximise  
[ ]
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taking as given the values of wj and Fj – that is, wi, wj, Fi and Fj are the outcome of 
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the bargaining units. 
In this context, there are two instruments at the disposal of downstream 
firms and upstream agents. Hence wi will be chosen to maximise the sum of the 
utility of the upstream agent i and the second-stage downstream profit jii λππ +=Π  
minus the disagreement payoff, while the fixed fee will be determined by the 
respective bargaining power of the parties. We obtain:  
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for all σ∈(0,2) and ϕ∈[0,1]. 
                                                                                                                                            
16 There are similarities between the two-part tariff case examined here and the 
literature on managerial incentives in oligopoly (see Fershtman and Judd 1987, 
Sklivas 1987). 
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Proposition 7. When quantity-setting downstream firms and independent upstream 
agents bargain over two-part tariffs, the unit input price is higher and the fixed fee 
lower under a downstream merger than when downstream firms are independent. 
This is the opposite of the result obtained for the case of linear tariffs and 
also the opposite of the result obtained in Symeonidis (2008) for two-part tariffs in 
a context where a change in the intensity of downstream competition did not 
involve a merger. As already pointed out above, an important difference between 
the present model and Symeonidis (2008) is what downstream firms wish to 
maximise at the bargaining stage: in the companion paper, it is their own second-
stage profit, iπ , while in the present model it is their overall second-stage profit, 
ji λππ + , minus a disagreement payoff. Proposition 7 may seem counterintuitive: 
upstream agents are still independent here, so the mechanisms described earlier to 
provide intuition for Proposition 1 still apply. There is, however, an additional 
mechanism.17  
First, note that under two-part tariffs the unit input price is set below w0 
when independent downstream firms set quantities: each upstream agent is 
effectively subsidising the downstream firm and using the fixed fee to compensate 
for this subsidy. When the downstream firms merge, the unit input price is set 
equal to w0. It follows that a merger causes w to increase. Why is this not the case 
in Symeonidis (2008)? A decrease in wi leads to a decrease in the output of 
product j. This implies a decrease in the subsidy provided by upstream agent j to 
the downstream firm j. Under a downstream merger this effect is internalised, but 
with independent downstream firms it is not (even when they may effectively 
                                                 
17 See Milliou and Petrakis (2007) for an analogous argument in the context of 
upstream mergers in a bilateral duopoly. 
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collude in the final stage, as in Symeonidis 2008). So a division of the merged 
downstream firm is less keen to push for a reduction in the unit input price below 
w0 than an independent downstream firm. It turns out that this effect, which is 
absent both in the linear tariff case and in Symeonidis (2008), dominates when the 
parties choose the level of w. Furthermore, since the fixed fee F is used to transfer 
profit from the downstream firm to the upstream agent, F is lower when w is 
higher and vice versa. 
Consumer surplus, downstream profit and upstream utility are given as 
****2*)*(*)*(2**2** 22 xpxxxCS −−−= βσβα   (25) 
**2***)***(2**Π Fxwp −−=   (26) 
and 
**2**)**(2** 0 FxwwU +−= , (27) 
where p** and x** are given by equations (5) after setting wi = wj = w**. 
 Note that consumer surplus and total welfare are independent of F** and ϕ. 
This is because (i) changes in fixed costs have no effect on marginal costs or 
quantities produced at equilibrium, and (ii) marginal costs are independent of the 
relative bargaining power of upstream agents and downstream firms because the 
use of two-part tariffs leads to joint profit maximisation by each bargaining unit. 
Since a merger between downstream firms increases the unit input price, it 
is not surprising that the effect on consumer surplus is standard. Downstream 
profit and upstream utility could move in either direction, since F falls while w 
rises, but these effects are also unambiguous in the present model. 
Proposition 8. When quantity-setting downstream firms and independent upstream 
agents bargain over two-part tariffs and ϕ∈(0,1]: (i) downstream profit increases 
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in the degree of cross-ownership λ, and (ii) consumer surplus, upstream utility 
and total welfare decrease in λ. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When ϕ = 0, U** is independent of λ and all the other results are unchanged. 
In summary, the welfare results are different under two-part tariffs than 
under linear tariffs when downstream firms set quantities. The main reason is that 
a downstream merger raises the bargained input price under a two-part tariff but 
reduces it under a linear tariff.18  
 
6. Bargaining over the input price and the level of output.  
I comment here briefly on the effects of a downstream merger when not only the 
input price but also output (or employment) is determined through bargaining. 
This setup is a plausible alternative to the model of section 2 when the upstream 
agents are unions, and it is also relevant for markets where downstream firms 
obtain their inputs from upstream suppliers under general non-linear contracts. 
The profit functions are the same as in section 2, but the game is now a 
one-stage game between bargaining units: each unit i decides on wi and xi taking as 
given the values of wj and xj. As has been pointed out in previous work on ‘efficient’ 
bargaining, the bargaining units essentially compete by setting quantities with 
marginal costs equal to w0 and w is set to share the surplus between the parties 
according to their respective bargaining power. This is also what happens in the 
                                                 
18 When the downstream firms are independent and set prices and bargaining is over 
two-part tariffs, the unit input price is set above w0. So a downstream merger reduces 
the bargained input price in this case (to w0). However, the welfare effects of a 
downstream merger are again standard. As in section 3 above, this is due to strong 
direct effects and weak indirect effects of a merger on consumer surplus and welfare. 
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present model: the downstream merger reduces output, and for reasons similar to 
those described in section 2 it reduces w as well. But since output does not depend on 
w, there is no indirect effect on consumer surplus, so this unambiguously falls. The 
reduction in output and the fall in w cause downstream profit to rise and (in the 
absence of an indirect effect on output) upstream utility to fall. Total welfare falls. 
 
7. Unobservable bargaining outcomes. 
A common feature of all the variants of the model analysed in sections 2-5 is that 
bargaining outcomes are observable by rivals before the price or quantity setting-
stage. This is a plausible assumption when the upstream agents are unions. On the 
other hand, when the upstream agents are firms, vertical contracts may be secret in 
some markets.19 Observable contracts have a strategic commitment value: by 
agreeing on a low input price, for instance, the downstream firm commits to be tough. 
This strategic commitment is no longer possible under secret contracting. In this 
section I will assume that the bargaining outcome between downstream firm i and 
its upstream agent is not made public and is therefore not observable by 
                                                 
19 Much of the literature on secret vertical contracts examines settings where a 
single upstream manufacturer sells to many retailers (Hart and Tirole 1990, O'Brien 
and Shaffer 1992, McAfee and Schwartz 1993, Rey and Tirole 2007 – the last of these 
also discusses the case where more than one upstream firms sell to a single retailer). 
Fumagalli and Motta (2001) compare the effects of upstream and downstream 
mergers in a vertical duopoly with bargaining over two-part tariffs. Nocke and White 
(2007) examine the impact of vertical integration on upstream collusion in a setting 
where each of a number of upstream firms sells a product to many downstream firms 
and contracts can be observable or unobservable. In all these papers, the contracts 
offered in equilibrium depend on the nature of the downstream firms’ out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. Since in my model each upstream firm bargains with only one 
downstream firm, out-of-equilibrium beliefs do not play any role. 
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downstream firm j and its upstream agent. Of course, the secrecy of vertical 
contracts only applies when λ ≠ 1; for λ = 1, the merged firm sets quantities or 
prices knowing both wi and wj. 
 I begin with the case of quantity-setting downstream firms, independent 
upstream agents and bargaining over a uniform input price. The structure of the game 
is the same as in section 2, except that bargaining outcomes are not made public. The 
inverse demand function for variety i is again given by (2) and the demand function 
by equation (3). To ensure tractability of the model we focus on a comparison of the 
Cournot-Nash case (λ = 0) with the full merger case (λ = 1). In the latter case, the 
equilibrium of the two-stage game is derived as in section 2. Under Cournot-Nash 
behaviour, the equilibrium is determined as follows (see also Rey and Stiglitz 
1995, Irmen 1998). Quantities at the second-stage subgame respond only to 
changes in the own input price according to the downstream reaction functions  
β
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Furthermore, the equilibrium input price w* is the outcome of a non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium between the two bargaining units, with wi set to maximise 
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where  is given by the inverse demand function. The 
equilibrium quantities are then derived by solving the system of the two second-
stage reaction functions given w*.  
[ jjiiii xxwRpp ),,(=
The equilibrium input price is: 
ϕσσ
αϕ
λ −+
−+=
= 28
)(4
* 00
0
www  (30) 
and hence  
 29
.
)28)(4(
))(2()2(
** 0
01 ϕσσϕσ
ασϕσϕ
λλ −+−
−+−−=−
==
www  (31) 
Thus a downstream merger between firms i and j reduces w*. 
Consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit and aggregate upstream 
utility are given by (9)-(11), where xi*, xj*, pi* and pj* are the new equilibrium 
values of x and p in the two-stage game. Straightforward calculations yield  
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which is positive when both σ and ϕ are large enough and negative when either σ 
or ϕ is small. The effect of a merger on downstream profit is always positive 
(since w* falls) while its effect on upstream utility is always negative:  
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Finally, for total welfare we have: 
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which is positive when both σ and ϕ are large enough and negative when either σ 
or ϕ is small.20 To sum up, all the results are the same as in the case of observable 
contracts, and so are the mechanisms that drive the results. 
                                                 
20 It is easy to check that ΔW*(σ = 2) = 2
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 Next, I consider price-setting in the final stage. For λ = 1, the equilibrium of 
the two-stage game is derived as in section 3. Under Bertrand-Nash behaviour, prices 
at the second-stage subgame respond only to changes in the own input price 
according to the downstream reaction functions  
4
2)2(
),( jijiii
pw
pwRp
σσα ++−== . (35) 
The equilibrium input price  is the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium between the bargaining units, with wi set to maximise  
Pw
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where  is given by the demand function. The equilibrium 
quantities are then derived by solving the system of the second-stage reaction 
functions given .  
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Consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit and aggregate upstream 
utility are given by (9)-(11), where xi*, xj*, pi* and pj* are the new equilibrium 
values of x and p in the two-stage game with price-setting firms. The effect of a 
merger on downstream profit is always positive (since  falls). Furthermore, we 
obtain: 
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Once again, all the results are the same as in the case of observable contracts. 
When the upstream agents are firm-specific rather than independent and 
downstream firms set quantities, the analysis is the same as the quantity-setting 
case above for λ = 0 , while for λ = 1 the results are those derived in section 4. It 
is straightforward to obtain: 
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Since the input price increases following a merger, consumer surplus falls. 
Moreover: 
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In other words, a merger reduces aggregate downstream profit and upstream utility 
when ϕ is large enough, and increases them when ϕ is small. Finally: 
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In this case too, then, all the results – and the mechanisms that drive them – are 
the same as when contracts are observable. 
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 The final case to examine is the case of bargaining over two-part tariffs 
between downstream firms and independent upstream agents (see also Fumagalli 
and Motta 2001). For λ = 1, the equilibrium of the two-stage game is derived as in 
section 5. Under Cournot-Nash behaviour, the equilibrium is determined as in the 
quantity-setting case with bargaining over a uniform secret input price except that 
two instruments, wi and Fi, are now available to maximise the Nash product 
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where  is given by the inverse demand function. It is easy to 
show that  
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Thus a downstream merger has no effect on the input price, although it reduces the 
equilibrium fixed fee, as expected. The absence of an indirect effect of the merger 
on consumer surplus, downstream profit and upstream utility working through the 
input price implies that all the welfare results are standard and similar to those for 
observable contracts. 
 
8. Concluding remarks. 
I have analysed the welfare effects of a downstream merger when there is bargaining 
between downstream firms and upstream agents. There was no scope for innovation 
or efficiency gains in the model, so the focus was on static welfare results and the 
implications of the vertical relationships. I have first examined under what 
circumstances a downstream merger between duopolists may have unexpected 
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welfare implications such as an increase in consumer surplus and welfare. I have then 
focused on showing how each of a number of changes in the benchmark model – in 
the mode of downstream competition, the bargaining structure or the upstream market 
structure – restores the standard negative welfare effects of mergers. Finally, I have 
shown that my results are robust to the bargaining outcomes being unobservable. 
The results are also robust to the downstream market structure being a three-
firm oligopoly where two of the firms merge, as I show in the Appendix. Modelling 
the downstream industry in the absence of a merger as a duopoly is a convenient 
simplification, necessary to ensure tractability of the model if one wants to allow 
ϕ to take any value between 0 and 1. However, mergers to monopoly are not likely 
to occur in practice. In the Appendix I relax this assumption. To ensure tractability 
of the model, I often focus on two special cases: when the bargaining power is 
equally distributed between upstream agents and downstream firms (ϕ = ½) and 
when upstream agents unilaterally set the input price or two-part tariff (ϕ = 1). The 
first of these cases is a natural benchmark, while the second is of particular 
interest since it was for high values of ϕ that the non-standard welfare results were 
obtained in section 2. I also assume that bargaining outcomes are observable by all 
downstream firms before the price-setting or quantity-setting stage. The results are 
identical to those of the basic model. 
An important assumption of the model is that a downstream firm and its 
upstream agent are already locked into bilateral relations when they bargain. This 
assumption is uncontroversial when the upstream agents are unions (see the 
discussion in Horn and Wolinsky 1988). When the upstream agents are firms, the 
exclusive relationship between a buyer and a supplier can be due to the fact that, 
before bargaining on price, the two parties have already made relationship-specific 
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investments that create lock-in effects and high switching costs. These investments 
would represent long-run decisions, while decisions about the input price are 
easier to reverse in the medium term.21 If so, the structure of the game analysed in 
the present paper is valid whatever the identity of the upstream agent. 
Despite the use of a specific structure and functional forms in the present 
model, many of the economic mechanisms than underlie the results are general. 
For instance, the fact that the input price is, under certain circumstances, lower when 
the downstream firms merge than when they are independent is not specific to the 
linear demand structure or even to the presence of bargaining. The fact that, following 
a reduction in the input price, the welfare results depend on the balance between a 
direct and an indirect effect of the merger is also quite general, as is the fact that this 
balance depends on a particular way on the mode of downstream competition. The 
mechanisms that cause the input price to rise under a downstream merger for 
particular bargaining and upstream market structures are also general.  
Although the main focus of the present paper is on welfare results, a testable 
prediction of the model is that the effect of downstream mergers on wages and input 
prices will depend in specific ways on the bargaining structure and upstream market 
structure. The empirical evidence on the effects of downstream mergers on wages 
is mixed (see Lommerud et al., 2006), and this is consistent with the view that 
mergers may reduce wages in certain circumstances or in some industries and 
increase them in others. 
                                                 
21 Even when a basic input price is specified in a long-term contract between an 
upstream and a downstream firm before any relationship-specific investment is made, 
the contract needs to allow for some flexibility, so discounts and even the basic input 
price are likely to be subject to regular renegotiation.  
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There are circumstances where a downstream merger will be beneficial for 
consumers and for society as a whole and circumstances where it will be detrimental. 
The aim of the present paper was to shed more light on the conditions under which 
we may need to qualify the conventional economic wisdom on the welfare effects 
of mergers. Much of the previous literature in this area has tended to emphasise the 
possibility of welfare gains from downstream mergers (or less intense downstream 
competition) in the presence of upstream firms or unions. This paper shows that in the 
absence of efficiency gains, downstream mergers may increase consumer surplus 
and overall welfare in specific circumstances: when downstream firms set 
quantities and bargain with independent upstream agents over uniform prices, 
although this will also depend on the degree of product differentiation and the balance 
of bargaining power. However, in most cases – including price competition, non-
independent upstream agents, bargaining over a two-part tariff and bargaining over 
both the input price and the level of output – downstream mergers will always 
reduce consumer surplus and welfare. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) From equation (9) and using (5) and (7): 
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depending on the values of σ and ϕ. It is easy to check that ΔCS*(σ = 2) = 
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 > 0 for all ϕ∈(0.8,1]. By continuity, ΔCS* > 0 when 
σ → 2 and ϕ is large enough, while ΔCS* < 0 when σ → 2 and ϕ is small. Moreover, 
ΔCS*(σ = 0) = 0 and σ∂Δ∂ *CS  at σ = 0 is given by β
αϕ
128
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3 w−−− , a 
negative expression. Hence ΔCS* < 0 for σ close to 0. 
(ii) The result for aggregate downstream profit is straightforward (see the discussion 
in the main text). For aggregate upstream utility, we obtain from equation (11) and 
using (5) and (7): 
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which is negative for ϕ∈(0,1].  When ϕ = 0, w* = wo and U* = 0. 
(iii) From equations (9)-(11) and using (5) and (7) we obtain: 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
(i) Consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit and aggregate upstream utility 
are again given by equations (9)-(11), where x* and p* are now given by equations 
(13) after setting wi = wj = wP. Consider first consumer surplus. We obtain: 
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(ii) The result for aggregate downstream profit is straightforward (see the discussion 
in the main text). For aggregate upstream utility, we have: 
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(iii) Finally, overall welfare is given by . We obtain: PPPP UCSW +Π+=
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Proof of Proposition 6 
(i) The result for consumer surplus is straightforward. 
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(ii) Downstream profit and upstream utility in the absence of a merger are given by 
equations (9) and (10), using also (5) and (7) and setting λ = 0: 
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With a downstream merger, we obtain, using (9), (10), (18) and (5) and setting λ = 1: 
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Proof of Proposition 8 
From equations (21), (23), (25)-(27) and (5), we obtain: 
[ ][ ] 01()1(416 )321(4)2(32 32
2
0 <−−++
−−−+−= λσλσβ
λλσσσ w
)1)(
()
2
2
+
−
λ
α**
∂
∂
λ
CS , (A26) 
 41
[ ] ,)1)(1()1(416 )(4** 322
2
0
λλσλσβ
αϕσ
λ +−−++
Φ−−=∂
∂ wU   (A27) 
where , 0)381()1()1(4)341(16128 233322 >+−+++−+++=Φ λλλσλσλλσ
[ ]322
2
0
)1)(1()1(416
)(4**
λλσλσβ
ασ
λ +−−++
Ψ−=∂
Π∂ w ,  (A28) 
where [ ] [ ] 0)31)(1(4)1(4)1(2 2 >Φ+−+−++−=Ψ ϕλλσλσλσ , and  
[ ] [ ][ ] 0)1)(1()1(416 )()1()4(8)321(48** 322
2
0
3222
<
+−−++
−−−−−+−−−−=∂
∂
λλσλσβ
αλλσσσλλλσσ
λ
wW . (A29) 
   
Three-firm oligopoly 
I analyse here the welfare effects of a merger between a subset of firms in an 
industry. I use the simplest possible setup: a three-firm downstream oligopoly 
where two of the firms merge. I also assume throughout that bargaining outcomes 
are observable by all before the price or quantity-setting stage. I begin with the 
case of quantity-setting downstream firms, independent upstream agents and 
bargaining over a uniform input price. The structure of the game is the same as in 
section 2, but there are now three downstream firms. The inverse demand function 
for variety i is given by 
)(2 kjii xxxp +−−= βσβα   (B1) 
and the demand function is 
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The Cournot-Nash equilibrium values of xi and pi in the second-stage subgame are: 
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in the region of w spaces where  ≥ 0, ≥ 0, i = 1,2,3. At stage 1 of the game, 
the downstream firm i and the upstream agent i form a bargaining unit and set wi 
to maximise  
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Solving for the equilibrium we obtain: 
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 Now consider a merger between two of the downstream firms, i and j. In 
the second-stage equilibrium we have: 
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At stage 1, the downstream firm k and its upstream agent set wk to maximise 
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  (B7) [ ] [ ] ,ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ −−−=Ω kkkkkk xwpxww
while the merged downstream firm bargains simultaneously and separately with 
the two upstream agents, i and j. The Nash product for the bargain over product i 
is: 
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and output of good j in case of a breakdown of negotiations between the merged 
firm and upstream agent i: the downstream market structure becomes then a 
duopoly and two products are offered, j and k. The Nash product for the bargain 
over product j is similar. 
 The values of wi, wj and wk that we obtain at stage 1 of the game are the 
outcome of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the three bargaining 
units. Solving the system of three first-order conditions we obtain, for ϕ = ½: 
))(29696320153612804096(2
**
0
765432
0
2/1
,
2/1
,
ww
ww
mergerjmergeri
−−+++−−+Θ+
==
==
ασσσσσσσ
ϕϕ (B9) 
),)(7848576140840968192(1
*
0
765432
0
2/1
,
ww
w
mergerk
−−+++−−+Θ+
=
=
ασσσσσσσ
ϕ (B10) 
where Θ =  > 0. 
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For ϕ = 1: 
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Thus a downstream merger between firms i and j reduces wi and wj (as in 
Proposition 1) and increases wk. 
Consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit and aggregate upstream 
utility are, respectively, given as 
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where xi*, xj*, xk*, pi*, pj* and pk* are the equilibrium values of x and p in the 
two-stage game. 
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where Θ1 is a positive function of σ for σ∈(0,2): this expression is a higher-order 
polynomial in σ, but it is easy to check that it is positive for σ = 0 and for σ = 2 
and that none of its roots is in the interval (0,2). Moreover, 
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is positive for σ = 0, negative for σ = 2, and has a single root in the interval (0,2) 
(Θ2 = 0 for σ ≈ 1.6197). In other words, a merger between two downstream firms 
always reduces consumer surplus when ϕ = ½. However, for ϕ = 1 a merger 
reduces consumer surplus only when σ is not too large. These results are similar to 
those in Proposition 2. 
 Simple but tedious calculations show that the effect of a merger on 
downstream profit is always positive and its effect on upstream utility is always 
negative, which is consistent with the results in section 2 (the details are omitted). 
Finally, I examine total welfare: 
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where Θ3 is a positive higher-order polynomial in σ – it is positive for σ = 0 and 
for σ = 2 and none of its roots is in the interval (0,2). Moreover, 
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is positive for σ = 0, negative for σ = 2, and has a single root in the interval (0,2) 
(Θ4 = 0 for σ ≈ 1.6204). Thus a merger between two downstream firms always 
reduces total welfare when ϕ = ½. However, for ϕ = 1 a merger reduces welfare 
only when σ is not too large. These results are the same as Proposition 2. 
 Next, I consider price-setting in the final stage. In the absence of a merger, the 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium values of xi and pi in the second-stage subgame are: 
[ ]
)34)(1)(2(8
)2)(2())(68()2(
ˆ
)34(4
)2)(2())(68(
ˆ
2
2
σσσβ
ασσασσσ
σ
ασσασσ
++−
−−+−−−++=
+
−−+−−−++=
kji
i
kji
ii
www
x
www
wp
 (B24) 
in the region of w spaces where  ≥ 0, ≥ 0, i = 1,2,3. At stage 1 of the game, 
the downstream firm i and the upstream agent i form a bargaining unit and set wi 
to maximise the Nash product in equation (B4). Solving for the equilibrium we 
obtain: 
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 Now consider a merger between two of the downstream firms, i and j. In 
the second-stage equilibrium we have: 
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At stage 1, the downstream firm k and its upstream agent set wk to maximise Ωk in 
(B7) while the merged downstream firm bargains simultaneously and separately 
with the two upstream agents, i and j. The Nash product for the bargain over 
product i is Ωi in (B8), where )4)(4(
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x  are now the price and output of good j in a 
downstream price-setting duopoly with two products offered, j and k. The Nash 
product for the bargain over j is similar. The values of wi, wj and wk that we obtain 
at stage 1 of the game are the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
between the three bargaining units. The model is now tractable only for ϕ = 1. We 
obtain: 
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Thus, for ϕ = 1 at least, a downstream merger between firms i and j reduces wi and 
wj (as in Proposition 3) and increases wk. 
Consumer surplus, aggregate downstream profit and aggregate upstream 
utility are given by (B17), (B18) and (B19), where xi*, xj*, xk*, pi*, pj* and pk* are 
now the equilibrium values of x and p in the two-stage game with price-setting 
firms. We obtain: 
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where Θ5 is a positive higher-order polynomial for σ∈(0,2): it is positive for σ = 0 
and for σ = 2 and none of its roots is in the interval (0,2). Hence, a merger 
between two downstream firms always reduces consumer surplus, at least when ϕ 
= 1, as in Proposition 4. 
 It is straightforward to show that the effect of a merger on downstream profit 
is always positive and its effect on upstream utility is always negative, which is 
consistent with the results in section 3. Finally, for total welfare we have: 
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where Θ6, a higher-order polynomial in σ, is positive for σ∈(0,2): it is positive for 
σ = 0 and for σ = 2 and none of its roots is in the interval (0,2). Thus a merger 
between two downstream firms always reduces total welfare, at least for ϕ = 1, as 
in Proposition 4. 
When the upstream agents are firm-specific rather than independent and 
downstream firms set quantities, the analysis of the three-firm case is the same as 
above and the equilibrium input price is given in equation (B5). If two of the 
downstream firms, i and j, merge, the second-stage equilibrium is given by 
equations (B6). At stage 1, the downstream firm k and its upstream agent set wk to 
maximise Ωk in (B7) while the merged downstream firm bargains with a single 
upstream agent over wi and wj. The Nash product is 
[ ] [ ϕϕ −−+−−+−=Ω 100, ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)(ˆ)( jjjiiijjiiji xwpxwpxwwxww ] . (B33) 
 The values of wi, wj and wk that we obtain at stage 1 are the outcome of a 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium between the two bargaining units. Solving the 
system of three first-order conditions we obtain, for ϕ = ½: 
2
0
2
0
2/1
,
2/1
, 64128
))(2516(2
** σσ
ασσ
ϕϕ −+
−−++==
==
wwww
MjMi
 (B34) 
2
0
2
0
2/1
, 64128
))(432(
* σσ
ασσ
ϕ −+
−−++=
=
www
Mk
. (B35) 
Hence 
0
)64128)(8(2
))(3832(3
** 2
0
2
2/1,02/1
,
>−++
−−+=−
=== σσσ
ασσσ
ϕλϕ
www
Mi
 (B36) 
 50
.0
)64128)(8(2
))(20(3
** 2
0
2
2/1,02/1
,
>−++
−−=−
=== σσσ
ασσ
ϕλϕ
www
Mk
 (B37) 
For ϕ = 1: 
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Thus a downstream merger between firms i and j increases wi and wj when 
upstream agents also merge (as in Proposition 5) and also increases wk. 
Since all input prices increase following a merger, it follows that consumer 
surplus falls. For aggregate downstream profit we have:  
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is negative for σ = 0, positive for σ = 2, and has a single root in the interval (0,2) 
(Θ7 = 0 for σ ≈ 1.02). Moreover, 
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where 
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is negative for σ = 0 and for σ = 2 and has no root in the interval (0,2). In other 
words, a merger between two downstream firms always reduces aggregate 
downstream profit when upstream agents also merge and ϕ = 1. However, for ϕ = 
½ a merger reduces downstream profit only if σ is small. These results are similar 
to those obtained in section 4. In particular, Proposition 6 can be rephrased, once 
we fix ϕ  to a certain value, to describe how downstream profit depends on the 
value of σ.  
For aggregate upstream utility we have:  
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is negative for σ = 0, positive for σ = 2, and has a single root in the interval (0,2) 
(Θ9 = 0 for σ ≈ 0.79). Moreover, 
)48)(1632)(2(128
)(
** 22
10
2
0
1,01 σσσσσβ
ασ
ϕλϕ −+−++
Θ−=−
===
wUU
M
,  (B45) 
where 
765
432
10
3108760
172814976266243686465536
σσσ
σσσσ
−+−
−++−−=Θ
  
is negative for σ = 0, positive for σ = 2, and has a single root in the interval (0,2) 
(Θ10 = 0 for σ ≈ 1.70). In other words, both for ϕ = 1 and for ϕ = ½, a merger 
between two downstream firms with firm-specific upstream agents reduces 
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aggregate upstream utility if σ is small and increases it if σ is large. Also, upstream 
utility is more likely to decrease when ϕ = 1 than when ϕ = ½. These results are 
again similar to those obtained in section 4. 
 Finally, it can be easily verified that overall welfare always falls as a result of 
a merger when upstream agents are firm-specific, as in Proposition 6. 
 The final case to examine is the case of bargaining over two-part tariffs 
between quantity-setting downstream firms and independent upstream agents. The 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium values of xi and pi in the second-stage subgame are 
again given in (B3). At stage 1, each downstream firm i bargains over wi and Fi 
with an independent upstream agent. The Nash product is 
[ ] [ .ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ −−−+−=Ω iiiiiiii FxwpFxww ]  (B46) 
Solving for the equilibrium we obtain: 
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 Note that ϕ can take any value in the interval [0,1]. Now consider a merger 
between two of the downstream firms, i and j. The second-stage equilibrium is 
given in (B6). At stage 1, the downstream firm k and its upstream agent set wk and 
Fk to maximise 
  (B49) [ ] [ ,ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ −−−+−=Ω kkkkkkkk FxwpFxww ]
while the merged downstream firm bargains simultaneously and separately with 
the two upstream agents, i and j. The Nash product for the bargain over i is: 
[ ] [ ] .)(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)( 10 ϕϕ −−−−+−++−+−=Ω jjjjjjjjiiiiiiii FxwpFxwpFxwpFxww (B50) 
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Solving for the equilibrium we obtain: 
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A downstream merger between firms i and j increases wi and wj (as in Proposition 
7) and can increase or decrease wk, depending on the value of σ. It is also easy to 
verify that the merger decreases Fi and Fj and can increase or decrease Fk. 
For consumer surplus, straightforward calculations yield  
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where 
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is negative: it is negative for σ = 0 and for σ = 2 and none of its roots is in the 
interval (0,2). Thus, consumer surplus is reduced by a merger, which again 
confirms the results of section 5. Furthermore, downstream profit always increases 
but upstream utility can increase or decrease following a merger (the details are 
omitted). Finally, for total welfare we have: 
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is negative: it is negative for σ = 0 and for σ = 2 and none of its roots is in the 
interval (0,2). Thus, total welfare is reduced by a merger, as in Proposition 8. 
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